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Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and 
What is Implicated [1] 
Unlike so many other distinctions in philosophy, H P Grice's distinction between what 
is said and what is implicated has an immediate appeal: undergraduate students 
readily grasp that one who says 'someone shot my parents' has merely implicated 
rather than said that he was not the shooter [2]. It seems to capture things that we all 
really pay attention to in everyday conversation'this is why there are so many people 
whose entire sense of humour consists of deliberately ignoring implicatures. ('Can 
you pass the salt?' 'Yes.') Unsurprisingly, it was quickly picked up and put to a wide 
variety of uses in not only in philosophy but also in linguistics and psychology. What 
is surprising, however, is that upon close inspection Grice's conception of implicature 
turns out to be very different from those at work in the literature which has grown out 
of his original discussion. This would not be much of a criticism of this literature were 
it not for the fact that discussions of implicature explicitly claim to be using Grice's 
notion, not some other one inspired by him (generally going so far as to quote one of 
Grice's characterisations of implicature). This still would not be terribly interesting if 
the notion Grice was actually carving out had little theoretical or practical utility. But 
I will argue here that Grice's own notion of implicature, one quite different from the 
ones most of us have come to work with, is in fact far more interesting and subtle than 
that which has been attributed to him. 
On the version of Grice's theory which I was taught, conversational implicature is a 
species of speaker meaning, and speaker meaning divides exhaustively into what is 
said and what is implicated. This is a common understanding of Grice, and a natural 
one, given Grice's obvious interest in speaker meaning. [3] But is also, as I shall argue, 
an unsustainable one, given Grice's understandings of saying and implicating. The 
problem for this understanding of Grice lies in the fact that Grice's characterisations 
of speaker meaning and conversational implicature are cast in very different terms'the 
former completely in terms of speaker intentions and the latter incorporating a good 
deal about the audience. As a result, the notions do not fit neatly into the simple 
picture that I was taught: there are many things which speakers mean that they neither 
say nor implicate. 
I will argue that the picture which emerges when we pay close attention to Grice's 
notions of saying and implicating is one which gives substantial weight to the 
normative side of language use. For Grice, what speakers say and what speakers 
implicate is not simply a matter of what they intend. In each case, there are constraints 
which prevent speakers from saying or implicating just anything. This fact has long 
been acknowledged with regard to Grice's notion of saying: for a speaker to say that P 
by means of a sentence S, it is not enough for her to mean that P'S must also be a 
sentence which (roughly) is standardly used to mean that P. [4] What I will argue is 
that there are similar constraints on conversational implicature: on this understanding, 
if a speaker implicates something, she has thereby made it available to her audience. 
Speakers don't always succeed in doing this, whatever their intentions. 
This paper will be devoted in part to a careful examination of Grice's actual theory, 
and to ways in which it deviates from common understandings of it. In the course of 
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this examination, an alternative picture of implicature will emerge, the one sketched 
all too briefly above. This picture, I will argue, brings out many important features of 
communication which are lost if we understand Grice's theory in a more traditional 
manner. Once we appreciate the distinctive character of the Gricean approach, 
however, we will see that more work has to be done. There are interesting phenomena 
that escape Grice's system of classifications. Accordingly, I suggest (what I hope are) 
natural ways of expanding Grice's taxonomy to make room for a wider range of cases. 
Speaker meaning which is neither said nor implicated
I'll start by showing just one way in which speakers may mean things which they 
neither say nor implicate. I'll explore this in a fair bit of detail, and take a look at some 
consequences it has for uses to which Grice's theory of implicature has been put, then 
move on to some other ways in which what speakers mean may include more than 
what they say and implicate. 
I'll start by showing just one way in which speakers may mean things which they 
neither say nor implicate. I'll explore this in a fair bit of detail, and take a look at some 
consequences it has for uses to which Grice's theory of implicature has been put, then 
move on to some other ways in which what speakers mean may include more than 
what they say and implicate. 
On Grice's picture, what is said is tightly constrained by linguistic meaning. 
Conventional implicatures are determined by linguistic meaning. This leaves non-
conventional implicature as the only vehicle for speaker meaning which goes well 
beyond conventional meaning. [5]" Frice only gestures at the possibility of non-
conversational, non-conventional implicatures, which, he suggests, are like 
conversational implicatures but arise from maxims other than the conversational ones. 
(Grice 1989: 28) For the purposes of this paper, I will ignore this category of 
implicatures, as the exact nature of the maxims generating non-conventional 
implicatures is irrelevant to my arguments. My focus here will be on conversational 
implicatures as the mechanism for speaker meaning beyond conventional meaning. 
1.1 Near-Implicature 
One way for a speaker to mean something which she neither says nor implicates is 
that she may try but fail to implicate it. In order to begin to see this as a possibility, I'll 
start with one of Grice's briefer characterisations of conversational implicature: 
'what is implicated is what it is required that one assume a speaker to think in order to 
preserve the assumption that he is following the Cooperative Principle (and perhaps 
some conversational maxims as well), if not at the level of what is said, at least at the 
level of what is implicated.' (Grice 1989: 86) 
Far from seeming like a part of what the speaker means, conversational implicatures, 
according to this, are entirely removed from the control (or possibly even awareness) 
of speakers. [6] What is conversationally implicated is not what the speaker is trying 
to communicate via the assumption that she is following the Cooperative Principle, 
but what the audience must assume the speaker to think in order to maintain this 
assumption. The speaker, then, may easily mean something which fails to be 
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conversationally implicated because the audience does not in fact need to assume it in 
order to preserve the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative. [7] 
An example of this sort of mismatch will aid the discussion. Suppose that I have spent 
far too much time reading Grice and my reference-letter writing has been affected. I 
have been asked to write a letter for a student, Fred, who is a poor philosopher and a 
chronic petty thief. I don't want to put such things in writing, but I want to write truths 
and to communicate that Fred should not be hired. Since Fred does happen to be a 
good typist, I write only this, trusting that Fred's prospective employers (who I take to 
be a philosophy search committee) will discern my message. [8] Unbeknownst to me, 
Fred is applying for a job as a typist. What I wrote was precisely the information that 
Fred's prospective employers require. They don't need to assume that I think anything 
other than what my words mean in order to preserve the assumption that I am being 
cooperative. [9] What I mean to communicate, then, fails to be implicated. It clearly is 
not said'since what is said is, for Grice, tightly constrained by conventional meaning. 
If this is right, then what a speaker means cannot be divided exhaustively into what 
she says and what she implicates. [10] 
Grice's fuller, more famous characterisation of 'conversational implicature' is 
somewhat different. On this characterisation, which gives three necessary conditions 
for conversational implicature, what the speaker actually thinks does have a role to 
play. But this still yields the result that speakers may mean things which they neither 
say nor implicate. [11] According to it, a person conversationally implicates that q by 
saying that p only if: 
(1) he is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the 
Cooperative Principle; 
(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his 
saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this 
presumption; and  
(3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) 
that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the 
supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice 1989: 30-31) 
The requirement which blocked the intended implicature according to the brief 
summary is the second condition given above: if q is to be implicated by S's saying 
(or making as if to say) that p, then the assumption that S thinks that q must be 
required to preserve the presumption that S is being cooperative. This is enough to 
open the gap between speaker meaning and implicature detailed above. The long 
characterisation differs from the shorter summary in the addition of some extra 
necessary conditions for conversational implicature. Clause (1) tells us that it must 
also be the case that the speaker is presumed to be following the Cooperative 
Principle. Clause (3) tells us that the speaker must think (and expect the hearer to 
think that the speaker thinks) that the supposition that she thinks that q is required. 
Clause (3), then, does introduce an element of speaker control: the speaker must 
believe that the assumption is in fact required. This is not, however, enough to bring 
about the attempted implicature. The implicature was blocked because a speaker 
cannot conversationally implicate something which the audience is not required to 
 3
     
assume that she thinks. This necessary condition has not been removed. Further, we 
will see shortly that clause (1) opens up new ways in which a speaker may mean 
something which she neither says nor implicates. 
1.1.1 Gricean Speaker Meaning
Thus far, I have worked with an intuitive understandng of the notion of speaker 
meaning, and argued that it cannot be understood as made up exclusively of what is 
said and implicatures. Grice, however, devtes considerable time to formulating a 
definition of speaker meaning, and if his version of speaker meaning is exhuasted by 
these notions, then perhaps what I have argued is wrong. Grice, and all his followers, 
may have been discussing a notion of speaker meaning which can be divided up this 
way. We'll see that this is not the case. 
Grice's's characterisation of speaker meaning is something like the following: [12] 
By uttering x, U meant that p iff for some audience A 
(1) U uttered x intending A actively to believe the thought that p (or the thought that 
U believes that p) 
(2) U uttered x intending A to recognise that U intends A actively to believe the 
thought that p 
(3) U does not intend A to be deceived about U's intentions (1) and (2). 
The important thing to note, for our purposes, is that the above definition does not 
permit the actual state of mind of the audience to impose any conditions at all on what 
the speaker may mean. Further, although the correct way to formulate Grice's 
definition is a matter of much debate, all versions share this feature. Since we have 
seen that the audience's state of mind can impose constraints on what is 
conversationally implicated, speaker meaning cannot be divided neatly into what is 
implicated and what is said. There is still room for a speaker to mean something 
which is not conventionally meant by her utterance, and which does not come to be 
conversationally implicated. 
1.1.2 A Consequence: Referential/Attributive 
An influential and popular use for the notion of conversational implicature has been in 
explaining the referential/attributive distinction as a distinction at the level of what is 
meant rather than at the level of what is said. Unfortunately, for reasons like those 
discussed above, conversational implicature is inadequate for this purpose. This does 
not mean, however, that no pragmatic explanation can succeed. Later in this paper I 
suggest some new pragmatic notions, related to conversational implicature, which can 
accommodate all the necessary cases. 
Our main example will be from Stephen Neale's Descriptions (1990). Neale provides 
the most explicit statement I have found as to how the conversational implicature 
explanation of the referential/attributive distinction is meant to go. [13] He begins by 
couching his explanation in terms of the Gricean distinction between what a speaker 
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says and what a speaker means. He then lays out the basics of Grice's theory of 
conversational implicature as a way of drawing this distinction. [14] Finally, he 
discusses a particular example of referential usage in detail. In this example, both the 
speaker, Neville [15], and his audience believe (and know each other to believe) that 
Harry is the present Chairman of the Flat Earth Society. Harry informs Neville that he 
will be in San Francisco on Saturday. Neville intends to communicate the object 
dependent proposition that Harry is coming to San Francisco. (Neale doesn't say why 
Neville should have this intention, but to make the example more vivid, we can 
imagine that Neville and his audience are deeply interested in Harry's travel plans. 
The conversation is, let's say, about their plan to implant electronic listening devices 
in the hotel rooms of Tom, Dick, and Harry, who they know to be visiting San 
Francisco in the next few weeks.) Neville utters (1): 
(1) The Chairman of the Flat Earth Society is coming to San Francisco on Saturday.  
Neville intends to communicate the proposition represented by (1N) [16]: 
(1N) <Harry, coming to San Francisco on Saturday> 
He succeeds in communicating this, and succeeds in doing so via conversational 
implicature. If Neville has uttered (1), and is obeying the maxims of Quality (which 
includes: do not say that which you believe to be false), and Relevance, then he must 
believe (1N). The audience must, then, assume that Neville believes (1N) in order to 
preserve the assumption that Neville is being cooperative, and Neville knows this. 
The implicature story, then, explains how (1N) may come to be communicated by (1). 
But consider the same example, with a small alteration. Imagine that the audience 
does not realise that Neville believes Harry to be the Chairman of the Flat Earth 
Society. In addition, the audience falsely takes Neville to be interested in bugging the 
hotel rooms of all the executives of the Flat Earth Society. All other facts are the same 
(in particular the facts about Neville's beliefs and intentions), and Neville makes the 
same utterance, fully intending to communicate (1N). Now the assumption that 
Neville believes (1N) is no longer needed in order to uphold the presumption that he 
is being cooperative. From the audience's perspective, he has made a perfectly 
relevant contribution to their discussion, and there is no need to suppose that he has 
any beliefs about Harry. Neville, then, will fail to implicate (1N). Nonetheless, if (1N) 
was a part of what Neville meant in the earlier version, it still is. No facts about 
Neville have changed from the first example to this one-- he still intends to 
communicate (1N), and to do so via his utterance of (1). So we have another case for 
which speaker meaning and implicature come apart. This particular case is one which 
seems to show us that not all instances of apparently referential usage can be 
explained by invoking conversational implicature. 
One might argue, however, that we are no longer discussing referential usages. 
Perhaps a description cannot be used referentially to communicate that p unless the 
conditions for conversational implicature are met: the audience's state of mind must 
be such that the assumption that the speaker believes that p is required if the speaker 
is to be understood as cooperative. (We saw that this is not the case in the example 
above.) If this were right, then, the way in which speaker meaning and implicature 
come apart would not pose problems for explaining the referential/attributive 
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distinction via conversational implicature. All the cases of referential usage would be 
ones for which a conversational implicature explanation could be given. 
But the suggested requirement would be at odds with what is said by key authors on 
the referential/attributive distinction. Donnellan (1979: 30) says the following: ''the 
referential/attributive distinction and the presence or absence of speaker reference 
should be based on such speaker intentions toward his audience or the lack of them'' 
Referential usage depends on speaker reference, which depends on speaker intentions. 
The actual state of mind of the audience is not meant to place any restrictions on 
whether or not a usage is referential. [17] 
This is not just sloppy formulation, either. The very next example Donnellan 
discusses after the above quotation is one in which the proposed requirement is not 
met. Donnellan notes (1979: 31) that '[t]he speaker's audience will not infrequently 
fail to recognise what he has in mind to talk about just from the uttered description 
and the context.' He considers a case in which the speaker utters (2), intending to 
communicate the proposition represented by (2N). 
(2) The fat old humbug we saw yesterday has just been made a full professor! 
(2N) <Norman, having been made a full professor> 
The audience, however, fails to grasp (2N), and asks 'Which fat old humbug?' 
Donnellan claims that (2N) is what is said by this utterance of (2). The implicature 
explanation of this case would be that (2N) is implicated by this utterance of (2). [18] 
But for (2N) to be conversationally implicated by the utterance of (2), it would have 
to be the case that, in order to preserve the presumption that the speaker is being 
cooperative, the audience must assume the speaker to believe (2N). In order to make 
that assumption, however, the audience would need to grasp (2N), which she clearly 
hasn't done. Nonetheless, the speaker's utterance appears perfectly cooperative. The 
audience needn't have any sense that the speaker is not trying to follow the maxims of 
conversation. If that's the case, however, (2N) cannot be implicated by this utterance 
of (2). Again, we have a referential usage which the conversational implicature 
explanation cannot be extended to cover. 
1.1.3 Presumption of Cooperativeness (Clause (1))
Grice's three-clause characterisation of conversational implicature not only continues 
to block attempted implicatures in cases like that of the Fred letter, but it actually 
blocks yet another sort of attempted implicature. "These implicatures are those which 
are blocked by clause (1), which specifies that, in order to conversationally implicate 
that q, the speaker must be presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at 
least the Cooperative Principle." Whether or not a speaker is so-presumed is not 
something that the speaker can control. "This yields yet another way in which a 
speaker may mean something, and attempt to conversationally implicate it, yet fail to 
do so." So it gives us yet another instance in which speaker meaning cannot be 
divided into what is said and what is implicated. [19] 
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An example: Cedric is applying for a philosophy job, and I think he's incompetent as 
a philosopher. I write that he is punctual and a good typist, expecting the audience to 
work out from this that I think Cedric is incompetent as a philosopher. In order to 
view my utterance as consistent with a presumption that I am cooperative, the 
audience needs to suppose that I think this. However, this presumption is not present: 
the audience has been told (falsely, and unbeknownst to me) that I disapprove of the 
practise of writing letters of reference. Accordingly, the rumour goes, I always write 
uncooperative, irrelevant letters. So (1) is not satisfied, and I fail to implicate that 
Cedric is an incompetent philosopher. 
1.1.4 Fixing the taxonomy
Our taxonomy, we've seen, is incomplete. "There are elements of what the speaker 
means which are neither said nor implicated. " Speakers sometimes attempt 
conversational implicatures which fail. "I propose that we add a new category to our 
taxonomy, that of utterer-implicature. [20] 
Utterer-implicatures are just like conversational implicatures except for modifications 
to clauses (1) and (2). First, it needn't be the case that the audience actually needs to 
suppose that the speaker believes the utterer-implicated proposition. It is enough that 
the speaker think the audience needs to suppose this. So, clause (2) is replaced by (2*): 
(2*) The speaker thinks that the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is 
required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) 
consistent with this presumption. 
Second, it needn't be the case that the speaker is actually presumed to be being 
cooperative. It is enough that he believe that he is so-presumed. So, clause(1) is 
replaced by (1*): 
(1*) The speaker thinks thathe is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, 
or at least the Cooperative Principle. 
The Gricean taxonomy that we've arrived at now is one on which speaker meaning 
divides into what is said, what is conventionally or conversationally implicated, and 
what is utterer-implicated but not conversationally implicated. Soon we'll see a need 
to add yet another category of speaker meaning. 
1.2 Near-Saying 
In the previous section, we discussed elements of speaker meaning which are meant to 
be implicated but fail to be. In this section, we will see that there are elements of 
speaker meaning which are meant to be said, but fail to be. 
On Grice's view, as on most views, if one intends to say that P but accidentally utters 
a sentence which conventionally means that Q, one has not said that P. [21] This kind 
of case is quite common. Two prime sorts of examples come from malapropisms and 
poor translations. [22] The utterer of (3), below, intended to say that which (3*) 
conventionally means. 
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(3) We're having a small conservative built onto the back of our house. 
(3*) We're having a small conservatory built onto the back of our house. 
An easy mistake to make in Spanish is that of uttering sentence (4) when one wants to 
say one is embarrassed. The right way to say this is with sentence (4*). 
(4) Estoy embarazado. 
(4*) Estoy azorado. 
Victims of this mistake utter a sentence which has the conventional meaning of (5), 
rather than (5*). [23] 
(5) I am pregnant. 
(5*) I am embarrassed. [24] 
(3*) is surely what the utterer of (3) meant, both in the ordinary sense and in Grice's 
sense. Yet it is not said-- (3)'s conventional meaning guarantees that. Moreover, it is 
not implicated by the utterance of (3)-- the speaker did not think that the audience 
would be able to work out that understanding her as having a belief about a 
conservatory was required in order to make sense of her making a claim about a 
conservative. She did not even realise that had uttered the wrong sentence. [25] The 
same problem arises for the Spanish mistake. (4)'s conventional meaning is that of (5), 
not (5*). So utterers of (4) do not say what is said by (5*). Nor do they implicate it. 
Utterers of (4) certainly don't think that audiences are able to work out that taking 
them to be embarrassed is required to make sense of them seeming to say that they are 
pregnant'they don't even know that they've chosen the wrong word. [26] What they 
mean is neither said nor implicated. 
Can our new notion of utterer-implicature help? No. An utterer-implicature is like a 
conversational implicature except that a speaker may implicate that Q by saying (or 
making as if to say) that P even if the supposition that the speaker thinks that Q is not 
in fact required to maintain the assumption that she is cooperative. It is enough that 
the speaker takes this assumption to be required in order to make sense of her saying 
(or making as if to say) that P. But our speakers in the examples we've just been 
discussing do not take that assumption to be required. 
We need, then, to acknowledge a category of propositions that a speaker attempts but 
fails to say. Speaker meaning, then, includes what is said, what the speaker tries but 
fails to say, conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures, and utterer-
implicatures which fail to be conversational implicatures. [27]  
Here I will begin to explore the possibility that some conversational implicatures may 
not be meant. "Grice is far less clear on this issue than one might have expected. "In 
this section, I note the possibility that there is room for unmeant conversational 
implicatures. [28] In the next section, I'll discuss some alternative interpretations 
which rule this out (as well as one which doesn't). 
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We have already seen that Grice's short summary of conversational implicature 
(1989:86) places no requirements whatsoever on the speaker's state of mind. Grice's 
three-clause characterisation of conversational implicature, however, does involve the 
speaker. Surprisingly, this characterisation also falls short of requiring that 
conversational implicatures be meant by speakers. For quick and easy reference, here 
are those necessary conditions again. 
(1) [the speaker] is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least 
the Cooperative Principle; 
(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his 
saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this 
presumption; and  
(3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) 
that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the 
supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice 1989: 30-31) 
To see that this falls short of requiring conversational implicatures to be meant, 
suppose that now I am writing a letter of reference for Roland, who is applying for a 
philosophy job. I like Roland personally and want him to do well, but I feel that I 
cannot in good conscience write him a positive letter, as he is a terrible philosopher. 
So I write a long letter, describing the classes Roland has attended and taught, and the 
topics on which he has written. I make no value judgments whatsoever. I know that 
the search committee is perfectly capable of realising that the only way to understand 
this letter as cooperative is to realise that I think Roland is not a good philosopher. 
However, I suspect that they will read hastily, be impressed by the sheer detail in the 
letter, and offer Roland a job. In fact, this is my plan. The claim that Roland is not a 
good philosopher meets the three necessary conditions for conversational implicature. 
However, I do not intend my audience to form this belief-- in fact I want them to form 
the belief that Roland is a good philosopher. [29] So, if the three necessary conditions 
suffice for conversational implicature, what I have conversationally implicated is not 
something that I mean. 
As described, this is a case in which I think that the audience will not pick up on my 
implicature. One might argue, then, that I really don't believe that they are capable of 
working out the implicature. I think they could work it out if they had more time and 
fewer applicants, but I don't really think they could given their circumstances. But this 
point turns out to be inessential to the example. I could write the very same letter with 
the belief that they will realise that I don't think well of Roland, accompanied by the 
desperate hope that they will somehow miss this. Despite my belief, I think it would 
be very hard to maintain that I intend my audience to form the belief that I do not 
think well of Roland. This is in fact the very last thing I'd like them to do. So there are 
claims which meet the three necessary conditions for conversational implicature, but 
which are not meant. This, of course, raises the possibility that perhaps more is 
required for conversational implicature than meeting the necessary conditions cited 
above. We will explore this possibility in the next section. 
Alternative Interpretations
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In "The Causal Theory of Perception" (Grice 1961), in which Grice suggests an aside 
that conversational implicatures must be meant. If Neale is right, then it's clear that 
there are no unmeant conversational implicatures. I think, however, that the passage 
cannot be as decisive as Neale takes it to be, as it has a rather odd status. Grice chose 
to omit the section in which this passage occurs when he compiled his collected 
papers for Studies in the Way of Words. There are very few other such omissions. 
The reason Grice gives for this omission is that the view presented there is 
'substantially the same' as that presented in his later papers, which contain fuller 
discussions. (Grice 1989: 229) This leaves us at quite a loss for what to do with the 
early aside: if Grice still thought conversational implicatures must be meant, surely he 
would have left it in, as it represents an important omission from his later 
presentations of the theory; on the other hand, if Grice had changed his mind, surely 
he would not say that the early presentation was 'substantially the same' as the later 
ones. Given its puzzling status, then, I think it would be inappropriate to draw 
conclusions about Grice's views from the omitted passage. 
Implicatures as Meant but not Said?
Another way to argue that implicatures must be meant is to focus on the words with 
which Grice introduces the three necessary conditions from 'Logic and Conversation' 
[30]: 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, 
may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that[...] (Grice 1989: 
30-31, emphasis mine) 
The three clauses then follow. Our current suggestion begins from the very reasonable 
claim that Grice's necessary conditions are meant to tell us when it's the case that 
some claim, which we already know to be implicated, is conversationally implicated. 
Reasonable as this is, it is very difficult to know exactly what it comes to. In order to 
even begin to understand conversational implicature, on this reading, we must already 
understand implicature. The only passages which might have given us this prior 
understanding occur on pages 24-25. There Grice says that he is introducing 
'implicate' as a technical term for a family of verbs which includes 'implied', 
'suggested', and 'meant', which he thinks we have an intuitive ability to recognise. [31] 
The problem with this is that what's implicated is meant to be distinct from what's said, 
yet anything which is said must be, for Grice, meant. This does not sit well with the 
thought that 'implicate' can stand in for 'meant'. One charitable interpretation of all 
this would have it that implicatures are any claims which are meant but not said. On 
this reading, then, the three clauses of Grice's definition tell us what is needed for 
something which is meant but not said to be a conversational implicature. 
This reading, of course, commits Grice to the claim that all conversational 
implicatures are meant. There are, then, no unmeant conversational implicatures. This 
consequence may well seem a happy one. But the reading is also problematic. If 
anything which is meant but not said is implicated, then what speakers mean as they 
accidentally utter the wrong words is implicated. Those who commit the Spanish 
mistake mentioned earlier implicate that they are embarrassed by uttering words 
which meant that they are pregnant. This seems quite odd to me. Certainly, we could 
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decide to use the terms 'implicature' and 'implicate' in this way, but it would, I think, 
be a change. [32] 
This reading commits Grice very strongly to the claim that speaker meaning divides 
exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated. Accordingly, my claim that 
there are elements of speaker meaning which are neither said nor implicated fails. 
However, a related claim can be made instead. Grice divides implicatures into three 
main categories'conversational (our main focus here), conventional, and non-
conventional non-conversational (because due to other maxims). There are, I have 
argued, claims which are meant but which do not fit into any of these categories. To 
avoid this result, the exhaustiveness claim may be taken as fundamental: anything 
which is meant but not said simply is implicated. On this reading, my arguments can 
be taken to show that Grice's taxonomy of implicatures must be wrong-- implicatures 
cannot be divided exhaustively into the three categories Grice suggests. [33] This 
alternative, then, merely shifts the location of my concern. Recognition of utterer-
implicature and near-saying offer a way of filling this relocated gap. [34] Importantly, 
we are still left with a more restricted understanding of conversational implicature 
than that which is commonly assumed. For the purpose of the rest of this paper, I'll 
mostly set aside this interpretation, as it won't matter to the points that I am making. 
My concern from here on will be mostly with the nature of and motivation for Grice's 
quite restrictive understanding of conversational implicature. 
What speakers implicate, according to Davis, is a very broad category: speakers 
implicate whatever they mean by saying something else. On the basis of this, he 
argues that Grice's inclusion of audience-oriented criteria in his necessary conditions 
for conversational implicature (which must include all that speakers implicate) was a 
mistake. Davis writes, 'S's [the speaker's] intentions do not depend on what anyone 
else presumes'[m]y having certain intentions cannot be constituted or generated by 
any fact about you.' Since 'to mean or imply something is to have certain intentions', 
Davis continues, Grice is wrong to include audience-oriented criteria in his 
characterisation of conversational implicature. (Davis 1998: 122.) 
Davis' views on the inclusion of audience-oriented criteria have some (to my mind) 
rather startling consequences. He discusses a case in which Carl says 'I feel sick' and 
Diane replies with 'A flying saucer is nearby'. Carl thinks what Diane said is false, and 
fails to see its relevance to his comment. Nonetheless, Diane 'might well have been 
[conversationally] implicating that Carl could get help from the doctors on the flying 
saucer'. (Davis 1998: 74.) Because of Davis' understanding of conversational 
implicature, anything that the speaker means to convey by what she says is 
conversationally implicated. So speakers like Diane, with extremely eccentric beliefs, 
can successfully conversationally implicate all sorts of surprising things. [35] 
I find this counter-intuitive. Davis' understanding of conversational implicature does 
have the consequence that anything which speakers mean is either said or implicated. 
But although he attributes this understanding to Grice, I think it's far from clear Grice 
that would agree with it. Grice's inclusion of audience-oriented criteria in his 
discussion of conversational implicature does not have the appearance of a careless 
aberration. Rather, he includes such criteria over and over, and is much clearer about 
the need for audience-oriented criteria than he is about implicatures being meant. All 
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this might be beside the point if there didn't seem to be any good reason to include 
such audience-oriented criteria, but I will suggest that there is good reason. 
It is problematic to rely upon intuitions to guide us in our understanding of 
conversational implicature. After all, 'conversational implicature' is a theoretical term, 
not a bit of ordinary English. Nonetheless, I, at least, have come to have intuitions 
about its use, and the use to which Davis puts it in his flying saucer example feels 
wrong. It feels wrong because it seems to me that speakers lack total authority over 
what is implicated, just as they do over what is said. Some other element has to enter 
in, and the audience seems a likely candidate. 
It seems to me not unreasonable to suppose that Grice had similar inclinations. 
Despite his focus on speaker intentions, he wanted what is said not to be entirely 
subject of the whims of individual speakers. Instead, he defined 'saying' in terms of 
both speaker meaning and sentence meaning, and defined sentence meaning by 
generalising across speakers. (Very roughly, the meaning of a sentence S, for Grice, is 
largely a matter of what speakers in general mean by their utterances of S.) This 
definition was not without its difficulties (see for example Neale 1992), but it did 
succeed in removing what is said from the total control of individual speakers. Grice's 
inclusion of the audience in his definition of 'conversational implicature' serves a 
similar purpose. With conversational implicature, generalising across speakers would 
be inappropriate given the importance of context. Instead, he looked to the other 
participant in the conversation'the audience. According to Grice, a speaker's intending 
to convey that P by saying that Q is not enough for the speaker to implicate that P. 
The audience must also need to believe that the speaker believes that P in order to 
preserve the assumption of the speaker's cooperativeness. This is an attempt to give 
some degree of intersubjectivity to the notion of conversational implicature. Speakers 
have authority over what they utterer-implicate, but they can't fully control what they 
conversationally implicate. [36] (As we will see in the next two sections, Grice is 
careful not to hand too much control over to the audience, either. What matters is 
what the audience is required to believe, not what she does believe.) 
The audience involvement that Grice builds into the notion of conversational 
implicature is what blocks the sorts of claims that Davis makes about his flying saucer 
example. Blocking those claims seems a reasonable thing to want to do. Since Grice 
did offer an account which ruled them out, rejecting that account as misguided in this 
regard requires more argument than Davis gives. 
Utterer-implicatures are claims that the speaker attempts to conversationally implicate. 
We can define a parallel notion for the claims that the audience takes to be 
conversationally implicated, audience-implicature. Audience-implicatures are just like 
conversational implicatures except that audiences have authority over what is 
audience-implicated. For this notion, we change conditions (2) and (3) of the three 
necessary conditions for conversational implicature. 
Clause (2) is replaced with (2A): The audience believes that the supposition that he is 
aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or 
doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption. 
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Clause (3) is replaced by (3A): The audience takes the speaker to think that it is 
within the audience's competence to work out that the supposition mentioned in (2) is 
required.  
This notion will prove useful to us in exploring the nature of conversational 
implicature, but it is also useful for dealing with certain sorts of everyday cases. 
Imagine, for example, that I am writing a letter of reference for my student Felix, who 
I consider to be an excellent philosopher. I falsely believe, however, that he is 
applying for a job as a typist, so I discuss nothing but his fine typing and punctuality. 
The audience, which is actually a philosophy appointments committee, takes me to 
have conversationally implicated that Felix is a poor philosopher. They are, of course, 
wrong: clause (3) of Grice's characterisation was not satisfied, as I had no idea that 
they would, or even could, work out from my utterance that I think Felix is a poor 
philosopher, and I would not have made my utterance if I'd realised the situation. This 
claim, then, fails to be conversationally implicated. But it is useful to have a term to 
describe its status, and it meets the criteria for audience-implicature. 
It is perhaps worth noting that certain passages in Grice fit better with audience-
implicature than with conversational implicature, but still fit only imperfectly. 
Consider, for example, Grice's short summary of conversational implicature, and 
another similar passage: 
[...]what is implicated is what it is required that one assume a speaker to think in order 
to preserve the assumption that he is following the Cooperative Principle (and perhaps 
some conversational maxims as well), if not at the level of what is said, at least at the 
level of what is implicated. (1989:86) 
Implicatures are thought of as arising in the following way; an implicatum [...] is the 
content of that psychological state or attitude which needs to be attributed to a 
speaker... (1989:370) 
In these passages, Grice makes no mention whatsoever of the speaker's actual state of 
mind. This suggests that they might be better understood as relating to audience-
implicature. However, audience-implicature requires more than is mentioned in these 
passages. Specifically, it must also be the case that (a) the speaker is being presumed 
to be cooperative and (b) the audience takes the speaker to think that the audience is 
capable of working out the implicature. The notion Grice alludes to in the passages 
above is one which focuses only on the fulfillment of the second necessary condition 
from the three-clause characterisation of conversational implicature.  
It is not. The reason for this is that some claims which are conversationally implicated 
fail to be audience-implicated. This is so whether or not being meant is taken to be a 
necessary condition for being conversationally implicated. Imagine that I write a letter 
for another poor student, Trigby, designed to communicate my low opinion of her as a 
philosopher. I say nothing about her that is relevant to the philosophy job for which 
she is applying, but confine my discussion to extolling her virtues as a rock-climber. 
The audience does realise the assumption that I think poorly of Trigby is needed. 
However, they also think that I didn't expect them to pick up on my poor opinion of 
Trigby. In fact, they are offended that I thought I could mislead them so easily. In 
such a case, I have conversationally implicated that I think poorly of Trigby as a 
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philosopher, whether or not we require that conversational implicatures be meant. But 
I have not audience-implicated that Trigby is a poor philosopher, as the audience 
doesn't realise that I thought they could work this out. This kind of imperfect 
communication counts as conversational implicature but not as utterer&audience-
implicature. 
We now have a good grip on the difference between claims that are conversationally 
implicated and those that are both utterer and audience implicated. But we have not 
yet seen why one might be interested in conversational implicature, rather than the 
intersection of utterer and audience implicatures, as I have defined them. This 
question at first seems difficult to answer. Anything which is utterer-implicated and 
audience-implicated, after all, has been successfully communicated. We can easily see 
why one would be interested in this notion. But conversational implicature, allowing 
as it does for certain sorts of imperfect communication, is more puzzling. 
On closer reflection, however, conversational implicature turns out to be an extremely 
interesting and important notion. We saw that some conversational implicatures failed 
to be audience-implicatures: audience error can lead to some claim failing to be 
audience-implicated, while it is still conversationally implicated. There are, then, 
cases in which we can reasonably say that the audience should have worked out the 
conversational implicature, even if they failed to do so. This means that 
conversational implicature is a more normative notion than utterer&audience 
implicature. 
To see the interest of a notion like this one, imagine that I write a letter of reference 
for Wesley, another of my (fictional) unpromising students. I know that Wesley is 
applying for a philosophy job, and I write a letter designed to communicate my low 
opinion of Wesley. I write (truthfully), 'Wesley's main virtues as a philosopher are 
punctuality, an attractive choice of fonts, and an encyclopaedic knowledge of illegal 
pharmaceuticals.' The audience, though certainly capable of working out from this 
that I think Wesley is a poor philosopher, reads too quickly, and takes away from the 
letter only the information that Wesley has encyclopaedic knowledge. They hire him, 
become disappointed, and complain to me. Saying that I utterer-implicated that 
Wesley is a poor philosopher is not much of a defense: I could have utterer-implicated 
that Wesley was Elvis if I was crazy enough to suppose that attributing this belief to 
me was required to make sense of my utterance, and that the audience could work this 
out. That something has been utterer-implicated does not show that the speaker has 
done enough to make the information available. But I did not succeed in audience-
implicating that Wesley is a poor philosopher, because my audience failed to realise 
that they needed to assume that I thought this. So I cannot defend myself by saying 
that I utterer&audience-implicated this claim. What I can do, however, is maintain 
that I conversationally implicated it: It was required in order to understand me as 
cooperative, and my audience was capable of working this out. 
Saying something does not guarantee audience uptake but does mean that the speaker 
has fulfilled her communicative responsibilities with regard to explicit content (as she 
wouldn't have done if she chose words which didn't have the conventional meaning 
that she intended). Similarly, conversationally implicating something also fails to 
guarantee audience uptake but does mean that the speaker has fulfilled her 
communicative responsibilities with regard to what she wants to communicate beyond 
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what she says. She may not have communicated her intended message, but she has 
made it available. The normativity of saying and conversationally implicating are 
quite parallel, although Grice uses different mechanisms to achieve this normativity 
for the two notions. 
Conclusion
We have seen that the standard understanding of Grice, on which speaker meaning 
divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated, does not fit with Grice's 
understandings of these notions. I have suggested new notions which can fill the gaps 
revealed in Grice's taxonomy. But I have also suggested that these gaps should not be 
viewed as mere careless errors: Grice can be seen as attempting, with conversational 
implicature, to do far more than merely fill out the rest of speaker meaning. When we 
closely examine the role and function of conversational implicature as characterised 
by Grice, we see that there is very good reason for a notion which doesn't fit neatly 
into the standard picture. The notion of information which the speaker makes 
available to the audience is an important and useful one, and one which all too easily 
goes unnoticed in discussions of implicature. 
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[1] I am very grateful to Kent Bach, David Braun, Wayne Davis, Ray Drainville, 
Mitch Green, Maria Kasmirli, William Lycan, Teresa Robertson, Charles Travis, the 
Sheffield Philosophy of Language Reading Group, and audiences at the Bolton 
Institute, the University of Glasgow, Nottingham University, the University of 
Michigan, Tulane University, and the University of Valencia for their comments and 
help with this paper. I owe a special debt to Chris Hookway for endless discussions of 
implicature which have made this paper far better (and far longer!) than it would 
otherwise have been. Finally, I thank the University of Sheffield Department of 
Philosophy and the AHRB for research leave to undertake the project of which this 
paper is a part. 
[2] According to the movie, 'Menendez: A Shooting in Beverly Hills', this is what 
Erik Menendez said when he phoned 911 (the US emergency services line). He later 
confessed that he and his brother were the ones who shot his parents. 
[3] A few examples will provide some indication of the popularity of this reading. 
Stephen Neale attributes this view to Grice on pages 73-83 of Neale 1990 and in 
Neale 1992. In the latter, there are two diagrams which show "what U meant" 
dividing exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated. (The diagrams make 
the first level of division between what's conventionally meant and what's non-
conventionally meant, but the division between what's said and what's implicated is 
still exhaustive. Laurence Horn (1992: 165) also provides a diagram showing what's 
meant dividing exhaustively into what's said and what's implicated, as does Stephen 
Levinson on page 131 of his 1983 textbook, Pragmatics. (For both Horn and Levinson, 
the first level of division is between what is said and what is implicated.) Kent Bach 
also apparently takes this to be the received view of Grice as he argues for an 
additional category, conversational impliciture in his 1994. 
[4] Actually making this work, particularly when we consider indexicals, is a bit of a 
nightmare. But the general idea is clear enough. 
[5] I say 'well beyond', because reference assignment for indexical terms is arguably a 
mechanism for speaker meaning beyond conventional meaning, as conventional 
meaning fails to determine such referents. 
[6] I am assuming that speaker meaning must be under the control or at least 
awareness of speakers. This seems a very common assumption in discussions of 
speaker meaning. 
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[7] Wayne Davis (Davis 1998) also discusses the irrelevance of Grice's necessary 
conditions to speaker meaning. Davis, however, draws very different conclusions 
from this. I discuss his views more fully in part 3. 
[8] Assume also that I mean that Fred is a good typist, so that this is said by my 
utterance. (Grice takes meaning that P to be a necessary condition for saying that P. 
One who utters a sentence which would normally say that P but does not mean that P, 
according to Grice, has only made as if to say that P.) The example can succeed even 
if I only make as if to say that Fred is a typist, but this introduces unnecessary 
complications. 
[9] Mitch Green has suggested to me in correspondence that what is required in order 
to preserve the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative should be evaluated 
with reference to the shared common ground of speaker and hearer. In the example 
above, there is no common ground with respect to the key question of what the letter 
is for-- I think that I'm to evaluate the candidate's philosophical abilities, and my 
audience thinks that I'm to evaluate his typing abilities. Without common ground to 
draw on, my utterance will presumably fail to generate an implicature. But I am 
unaware that this common ground is missing, so I attempt to implicate that Fred is not 
a good philosopher. (If I were aware that the context was not shared, I would not 
attempt this implicature, but since I am unaware that the context is not shared, it is 
difficult to see how this fact could affect my intentions.) This approach yields no great 
improvement on that suggested in the text. Although the reason is different, we still 
have a case in which the speaker means something which is neither said nor 
implicated. 
[10] If one takes anything which is meant but not said to be an implicature, this 
example can seen as demonstrating the need for new sorts of implicature. See part 3 
for more on this. 
[11]The exact status of this characterisation is somewhat controversial. Some authors 
treat it as a definition, while others do not. I will explore its status in some detail in 
part 3. For now, however, all that matters to my argument is that the three clauses of 
this characterisation represent necessary conditions for conversational implicature, 
and this much should be uncontroversial. 
[12]This characterisation has, notoriously, been reworked over and over again. I have 
chosen the characterisation above, taken in part from the discussion in Neale (1993) 
[13]Other authors who invoke implicature without being so explicit about how it 
figures in the explanation include Kripke (1977) and Blackburn (1984). 
[14]In addition, his 1992 makes it utterly clear that he takes speaker meaning to be 
composed exhaustively of what is said and what is implicated (conventionally and 
non-conventionally). See in particular the diagrams on pp 524, 543. 
[15] In Neale's book, he himself is the speaker, but this makes discussion of the 
example in connection with Neale's view of it a little confusing in the present context. 
In addition, I make some additions and alterations to the example, and I wouldn't want 
these to be read as relating to Neale himself, so I have substituted the fictional Neville. 
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[16]Neale actually leaves the exact nature of this proposition open, stating that it may 
be object-dependent without containing the individual Harry. I represent it as above 
for simplicity, because the details do not matter to the point I am making here. 
[17]The speaker's beliefs about the audience's states of mind may of course place 
restrictions on what intentions the speaker can form, but this is quite a different matter. 
[18]Actually, Donnellan himself is quite unclear about whether his distinction is at the 
level of what is said, as noted by Kripke (1979). But, as Kripke argues, the only way 
to understand Donnellan's distinction as a problem for Russell's Theory of 
Descriptions-- its intended purpose-- is to take it to be at the level of what is said. 
Certainly this is (or so it seems to me) the standard interpretation of Donnellan. 
[19]On the alternative reading alluded to earlier, this claim needs to be reformulated. I 
discuss this in part 3. 
[20] Utterer implicature should not be confused with Davis' (1998) notion, speaker 
implicature, which I discuss in Part 3. 
[21]Unlike many others, Grice also denies that, in such cases, one has said that Q. But 
this controversial bit of his view is not relevant to my concerns. 
[22] Donald Davidson (1986), of course, also discusses malapropisms in connection 
with Grice's views. The use to which he puts malapropisms, however, is very different 
from the use I make of them. 
[23] I thank my brother, Joe Saul, for his memorable demonstration of this mistake. 
[24]A wonderful, though imperfect, example of mistranslation is John F Kennedy's 
Berlin utterance of 'Ich bin ein Berliner' when he should have uttered 'Ich bin Berliner'. 
The latter means I am a Berliner while the former -- so the story goes-- means I am a 
jellydonut. The example is imperfect, however, because the sentence Kennedy uttered 
was ambiguous. The jelly donut reading was indeed strongly favored, due to the 
presence of 'ein', but the Berliner reading was still possible. So it's not 
straightforwardly the case that Kennedy didn't say that he was a Berliner. I thank 
Christian Piller for saving me from false claims about this example. 
[25] Some utterers, of course, might realise that they had uttered the wrong sentence. 
But our focus here is on someone who doesn't realise this. 
[26] In both these cases, I focus on the fact that clause (3) is unfulfilled. It seems less 
clear to me that clauses (1) and (2) are unfulfilled, as it does seem reasonable to 
suppose that the audiences could use conversational maxims in order to make sense of 
the speaker's utterance. 
[27]It shouldn't surprise us that we need a category of what the speaker attempts to 
say. In fact, it fits well with the fact that Grice allows for a category of what the 
speaker 'makes as if to say'. A speaker makes as if to say that P if P would normally 
be said by the sentence the speaker utters, but is not meant by the speaker. Saying, for 
Grice, involves both speaker meaning and conventional meaning. Surrounding it, then, 
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we have notions which involve only speaker meaning and only conventional meaning. 
I should note also that there may well be other kinds of speaker meaning, which fit 
into none of the categories given above. 
[28] I do not want to commit myself to the idea that there can be unmeant 
conversational implicatures, as I think these issues are incredibly tricky. But I do want 
to argue that the idea is not so obviously crazy as one might have supposed. I am very 
grateful to Chris Hookway for discussion of this idea. 
[29] Whether or not I mean that Roland is a good philosopher may be a contentious 
issue. Fortunately, we don't need to settle it here. 
[30] I thank Kent Bach and Chris Hookway for pointing out this line of interpretation. 
[31]In 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions,' Grice writes, ' 'Implicature' is a blanket 
word in order to avoid having to make choices between words like 'imply,' 'suggest,' 
'indicate,' and 'mean'.' He seems a bit less comfortable here with our grip on these 
notions, as he continues: 'These words are worth analysing.' (1989:86.) 
[32] Another passage which can be read as suggesting the interpretation suggested in 
this section occurs in "Further Notes on Logic and Conversation" on page 41 of Grice 
1989. There Grice describes his view in "Logic and Conversation" by writing, "I was 
operating, provisionally, with the idea that, for a large class of utterances, the total 
signification of an utterance may be regarded as divisible in two different ways. First, 
one may distinguish, within the total signification, between what is said (in a favored 
sense) and what is implicated; and second, one may distinguish between what is part 
of the conventional force (or meaning) of the utterance and what is not. This yields 
three possible elements'what is said, what is conventionally implicated, and what is 
nonconventionally implicates'though in a given case one or more of these elements 
may be lacking. For example, nothing may be said, though there is something which a 
speaker makes as if to say." This passage can certainly be read as supporting the idea 
that speaker meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated. 
But doing this requires assuming 'total signification' to be a synonym for 'meaning'. 
(As Chris Hookway has pointed out to me, it would be odd for Grice to introduce a 
new term if he was discussing his by now familiar notion of meaning.) It also requires 
us to put aside Grice's qualifying phrases, in particular the fact that he takes himself 
only to be describing a taxonomy for "a large class of utterances", rather than one that 
is applicable to all utterances. I am not sure whether these moves are appropriate, but 
if they are made this passage can lend support to the idea that the view described 
above should be attributed to Grice. 
[33]At least as he characterises them: the category of non-conversational, non-
conventional implicatures could of course include near-saying and utterer-implicature. 
But Grice would have to give up the claim that the implicatures in this category are 
just like conversational ones except that they are generated by different maxims. 
[34]The notion of utterer-implicature can easily be revised to be more in accord with 
this interpretation, according to which implicatures must be meant. The simplest way 
to do this would be to add a clause demanding that, in order to conversationally 
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implicate that q, the speaker mean that q. This modification makes no real difference 
to my paper, so I'll merely note its possibility. 
[35]It is worth noting that on the view considered in 3.2, the alien doctor claim also 
counts as implicated. However, on that view it does not count as conversationally 
implicated. 
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